Two Nobel Ideas for California Water

Two Nobel Ideas for California Water

By Paul H. Betancourt

Copyright January 2016

            When President Obama came to the Valley in 2014 to see the effects of the drought he shrugged his shoulders, blame climate change, hopped back on Air Force One, flew to Palm Springs to play gold with King Abdullah of Jordan and give him a billion dollar check. That was the best our government could do. Maybe there is an alternative.

Amartya Sen

The 1999 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Amartya Sen for proving that government policies turn droughts into famines. Sen wrote extensively about the 1943 famine in Bengal, the 1972-74 famine in Ethiopia and the the 1972 famine in the Sahel. Dr. Sen writes, “Droughts may not be avoidable, but their effects can be.” If government policy can starve people to death, which is the slowest way to kill somebody, then maybe we want to make sure we get policy right. There is a lot at stake here.

           

Elinor Ostrum

            One of the things that drove me crazy in 2014 was the passage of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. As soon as they cut off surface water from our reservoirs they jumped up and down and said, “You have a groundwater problem.” Of course we do, that is why we put in the surface water systems! Over 70 years ago we knew we had a ground water problem. We put is the reservoirs and canals so we would have reliable water to grow our population and our economy- and it worked!

            OK, enough ranting. Elinor Ostrum was co-winner of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics. Ostrum’s work focuses on Common Pool Resources (CPR’s), and the government institutions to manage these resources.

            Ostrum’s work is not limited to the Western world or merely to our time. In her 1990 book Governing the Commons she also studies institutions that manage Common Pool Resources in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkey and Japan. She also studies groundwater management in Southern California in the 1960’s as well as historic irrigation management in Spain and historic timber management in Switzerland. Ostrum’s conclusion is there are significant structures and policies that can be entered in to voluntarily by resource entrepreneurs. These agreements can be monitored internally and/or by governments.

            Ostrum’s “Design Principles and Institutional Performances” for successful use of Common Pool Resources include-

Clear boundaries and memberships-individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.

Congruent roles-Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material and. Or money.

Collective choice arrangements- Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.

Monitoring- Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviors, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.

Graduated Sanctions- Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms- Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.

Regional rights to organize-The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external government authorities.

Nested assets- Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and government activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

 (Ostrum p. 90-102)

Please remember these principles are not academic theory, they are time tested principles. The point of Ostrum’s work is that we have a Nobel proven alternative to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons scenario. Since publication in 1968 the image of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ has driven people to conclude that resource entrepreneurs cannot be trusted to use resources in a responsible and sustainable manner.

In Conclusion

            Whether you agree or disagree with Dr. Sen or Dr. Ostrum we have to agree they have world class ideas that we can apply here at home. Before we run off with more central command and control ideas from Sacramento and DC we should consider their Nobel Prize winning ideas. Historically, governments make droughts worse. Properly done, local control of common pool natural resources works better than centralized command and control.

Ostrum, Elinor, Governing the Commons,    1990.

Sen, Amartya, The Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze Omnibus, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999.